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THE ROLE OF SIMULATION EXERCISES IN THE ASSESSMENT 
OF ROBUSTNESS AND RESILIENCE OF PRIVATE OR PUBLIC 
ORGANISATIONS 
JEAN-LUC WYBO 
Ecole des Mines de Paris, PO Box 207, 06904 Sophia-
Antipolis, France 
Abstract. This paper deals with the organization of simulation exercises to 
prepare organizations to face emergencies. The original objective of such 
simulations is to train people to emergency procedures and devices; we 
raise the question of training people to face potential crisis situations: are 
simulations fitted to that objective? Through the observation of a number of 
exercises organized by private companies and rescue services, we can 
answer that naïve interpretation of simulation results limits their benefits to 
the correction of gaps between prescribed and observed actions, without 
addressing complex organizational behaviour. We introduce a method to 
organize simulations that gives access to this complexity and to the 
resilience and robustness capacities of the organization by giving specific 
roles to observers. This method uses a model of the organization seen as a 
combination of three levels: structures, relations and meaning. 
Keywords: Emergency management, simulation of accidents, organizational 
learning, resilience, robustness 
1. Introduction 
With the growing complexity of technological and organizational systems, 
companies and public bodies have developed the use of simulations, 
exercises and drills in order to train their staff to face hazardous situations. 
These simulations are related to emergency plans: dangerous situations 
or critical phenomena that have been identified as potential threats are 
CRISIS SIMULATION EXERCISES, RESILIENCE AND ROBUSTNESS 
played out and analyzed with the aim to define or check prevention and 
protection measures and to validate intervention plans. Exercise scenarios 
are designed to give people opportunities to “play the game” in realistic 
conditions, practice plans and test the use of technological devices. 
Our observations and analysis of a series of simulations (toxic leak in a 
refinery, fire and toxic gas in road tunnels, terrorist attack in the metro, etc.) 
have shown the benefits but also the limitations of such simulations in terms 
of lessons (behaviors, decision making) learned by participants. 
Among the benefits, the setting up of the exercise is in itself a good 
opportunity to gather the many stakeholders and to discuss “who is in 
charge of what”; this facilitates mutual knowledge among technical staff 
and shared values in the different organizations. The second kind of benefit 
is the test in realistic conditions of the technological devices and means 
(medical tents, fire extinction means, communications, etc.) and their use. 
Among the limitations, the poor level of realism of the simulation is 
often an obstacle to the commitment of participants, who don’t react as they 
would in a real, stressful situation. Another limitation lies in the evaluation 
method; people are evaluated for their strict application of plans, compared 
to “official” plans and procedures. Any difference in behavior is seen as a 
violation of rules and sanctioned or at least pointed to as an error, which 
strongly reduces people's willingness to innovate. 
From this analysis, it can be concluded that simulations are efficient in 
creating opportunities for people to work together and to improve their 
practice of anticipated situations. But do simulations improve the ability of 
organizations to avoid or manage crises? Based on different non-participant 
observations and in-depth interviews, our answer is “no", to the extent that 
their analysis is limited to the identification and correction of deviations 
from the prescribed tasks. 
 We define a crisis as a situation in which an organization is 
overwhelmed and destabilized, as compared with emergency management, 
a situation in which the organization remains in control, applying known 
plans and procedures (Wybo 2004). In this context, resilience corresponds 
to the ability of the organization (at any level) to keep achieving its tasks by 
adapting its functioning to hazardous situations, uncertainty, time pressure 
and threats. Robustness corresponds to the ability of the organization to 
survive and stay under control by the emergence of new organizational 
patterns. 
In observing simulations, we have identified individual and collective 
reactions to difficulties that were neither part of the scenario nor foreseen in 
the emergency plans. If the difficulties are relatively small, individuals and 
groups use their skills and experience to adapt plans, procedures and 
behaviors, in order to achieve their tasks in those degraded contexts. By 
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doing so, they contribute to the organization’s capacities of resilience. 
When faced with unanticipated and threatening events or situations, some 
people (generally the most experienced) show capacities of robustness: they 
emerge from the group, commit themselves to “do something” and find 
innovations to cope with the real situation. In some of those situations, new 
organizational patterns emerge, for example the creation of different 
communication flows or an alternate distribution of tasks. With such 
actions, those individuals and groups demonstrate their capacity to 
contribute to a higher level of robustness in the organization. 
In order to go further in this reflection, we have designed a method to 
observe and analyze simulation exercises, allowing the identification of 
such behaviors, the context in which they appear and the lessons that can be 
learned from this analysis in terms of resilience and robustness capacities 
(Wybo, Jacques, Poumadère, 2006). 
2. The role of simulations 
2.1. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND RISK PERCEPTION 
It is now widely accepted that safety management inside the organization 
has to consider, in addition to the physical characteristics of dangers in the 
working place, the way risks are perceived by those involved. 
The study of risk perception inside organizations deals with the 
comprehension of tasks and the definition of working situations when these 
may constitute a threat for the physical integrity of personnel, installations 
security, and even the safety and health of populations outside the 
organization. 
Taking risk perception into account can be considered as one remedy for 
"normal accidents" as suggested by Weick (1986) who shows that systems 
vulnerable to normal accidents (Perrow, 1984) are at the same time contexts 
where individuals try to understand and manage complexity. Weick 
suggests preventive and learning actions through which individuals and 
groups become able to build elaborated interpretations of what they do and 
experience, leading them to analyze events other than those strictly limited 
to technical matters. Jacques & al. (1999) have shown, using cognitive 
mapping, the evolution of learning over time by using preventive learning 
technique.  
 
The challenge is thus for the organization to integrate safety 
management in two manners: first by taking into account human and 
organizational factors and not only technical factors of safety, and second, 
through involving fully all the actors inside the organization. When the risk 
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of accident concerns outside populations, a wide array of stakeholders can 
be involved.  
Safety integration can be achieved through training and preventive 
actions. A second way is through simulation. The specific advantage of 
simulation as a source of lessons is that it puts forward many aspects of 
what people prefer not to think about in their everyday working life 
situation: accidents and crises. In terms of perception, a simulated accident 
makes manifest events which otherwise might remain unknown, unseen and 
unheard of.  
The simulation of a large accident involves many different players 
whose role is to intervene in case of accident. In normal times, these people 
do not meet nor are part of the high reliability organization (they are 
generally not part of the organization in charge of the routine activities). 
When the accident occurs, they must understand the situation, switch from 
the routine work to emergency management, cooperate and coordinate 
themselves in order to mitigate the accident and keep the situation under 
control. This very fact is in itself a complex organizational achievement, 
costly in terms of material and human resource mobilization. 
Under normal operations, it is the occurrence of the accident that 
triggers a wide array of events, ranging from the focus of attention of 
personnel to the calling together of many outside players. The accident has 
the upper hand. In the case of simulation, the human minds of scenarists 
will take the lead. What difference does this make? This is what we aim to 
distinguish here, principally in terms of learning, which is chief among the 
assessment of resilience and robustness capacities of organizations. 
Put simply, one can say that simulation creates for the organization an 
intermediate state between normal operations and crisis situations. While 
some of the preparedness required to face potential crisis situations can be 
acquired during normal times, other levels of learning can be acquired only 
outside normal situations, i.e. during crisis situations or simulations. 
We focus in this paper on learning during simulation situations. To 
understand the dynamics of this type of learning, we have to consider some 
aspects of safety management in ordinary times. How safety is recovered 
during and after a crisis can then be examined on that basis. 
2.2. SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN NORMAL TIMES AND DURING CRISIS 
When a safety issue is raised, one may observe that everyone in the 
organization has an opinion on the question. While the starting point of this 
opinion is the shared objective to avoid accidents and prevent operational 
errors, reasoning and references, often implicit, may rapidly diverge. 
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This can occur according to the position and role of the actor, his 
knowledge of risks and operations, possible defensive mechanisms that are 
in use in his working environment (Argeris & Schön, 1996), (Dejours, 
2000), orientations set by the hierarchy and the top management, etc. 
In addition, the perceived contradiction between the a priori shared goal 
of a high level of safety and secondary divergences can lead to 
misunderstandings or stalled situations, which in turn are counterproductive 
for safety. The extent and efficiency of preventive actions, as well as 
communication with stakeholders, can thus suffer. 
Organizations are bound by many levels of requirement or obligation in 
regard to safety assurance (Poumadère and Mugnai, 2006). The first level is 
individual obligation, which includes to follow consigns and basic rules, 
such as wearing the mandatory individual protections. Obedience is a must, 
along with the notion of self protection and, in some cases, that of survival. 
In most settings and most of the time, this level of obligation can appear 
disconnected from the apparent requirements of tasks. However, during 
accident and crisis situations, this basic level plays its full role and it is 
expected to be automatically integrated in behaviors. This context may 
restrain individuals to commit themselves to adapt procedures or innovate, 
as this behavior will be perceived as violations of rules. 
Another level is that of economic obligation; simple economic 
rationality favors investments in prevention so as to avoid the very high 
direct and indirect costs of accidents. This level is most often disregarded 
during accident and crisis, as urgency prevails and exceptional expenditures 
may be undertaken. Even so, adaptations and innovations achieved on the 
spot are often done with very few resources, but without a clear evaluation 
of costs that may result later on from these actions (either in reduction or 
aggravation of damage). 
The managerial obligation resides in the fact that safety figures among 
collective performance factors and must be managed to that effect, in itself 
and alongside other performance factors with which it is in interaction. 
During accidents or crisis, this managerial coordination of decisions is 
likely to be crucial, as long as the system remains under control of the 
organization. When the situation goes beyond the limits of routine, this 
obligation becomes less and less crucial compared to the willingness of 
players to do something useful at their own scale. In resilient organizations, 
the management will decentralize control and give to their staff more and 
more degrees of freedom in action as the situation escapes from control.   
The legal obligation refers to the existence of the organization within a 
state of law, applied to all organizations which have to conform to 
established norms and prescriptions. Often this level prevails in the 
organization when safety is considered; i.e., safety actions and investments 
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may be framed as responses to minimum legal requirements. However, 
during accident and crisis situations, the need to invent ad-hoc solutions and 
organizational patterns may make that level less predominant. In a similar 
way than individual obligation, legal obligation reduces the willingness for 
adaptation and innovation, as people may be sanctioned for violating rules, 
especially if there are casualties and financial damage. 
The professional level of obligation corresponds to the best possible 
application of scientific and technical knowledge by Safety experts; in some 
contexts all members of the organization are invited to integrate safety 
within their professional identity. During degraded situations, experts tend 
to consider adaptations and innovations as a “normal way” to use their skills 
and experience when they have to cope with a risky situation. By doing so, 
they will be reluctant to talk about (either because they think that every 
professional would have done the same or because they want to keep secret 
what gives them the status of expert) and this “expertise in action” will not 
be shared and learned by other players. 
The reciprocity obligation corresponds to interdependency and 
solidarity, which exist de facto within working relationships and make each 
of us responsible for others' safety, which can extend to relations with the 
environment of the organization and its protection. This obligation plays its 
role during degraded and crisis situations and contribute to organizational 
resilience as it governs interactions among players. 
The moral obligation puts forward the value of human life, primordial 
within our cultural ethics, and for which better safety for all is a goal. This 
obligation plays an important role in the commitment of people when they 
perceive threats for other people. 
These levels of obligation influence perceptions and role playing at all 
levels of the organization and thereby influence safety practices in routine 
activities and during emergencies. As shown above, obligations change in 
meaning and salience according to whether the organization is in a normal, 
degraded or crisis situation. It is thus useful in each context to assess safety 
obligation levels, both in ordinary times and for accident or crisis situations. 
The bridges built between these two different instants in organizational life 
can contribute to resilience and robustness if it is possible to observe and 
analyze them. This is our main objective during the simulation exercises. 
2.3. INTERPRETATIONS OF SIMULATIONS’ ANALYSIS 
In the usual way of organizing exercises, one uses a rational model to 
measure the gaps between prescribed and observed actions as the scenario 
unfolds, and to explain in an objective way the causes of those deviations. 
This approach can be called “naïve”, as it doesn’t reach the complexity of 
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the organization during emergencies and crisis. It can be associated with 
“simple-loop learning”: measuring gaps and correcting them. 
In this paper, we present a method to observe an organization during a 
simulation based on the plurality of specialized observers’ points of view. 
Taking their observations together allows us to address the complexity of 
organizational behavior, to generate meaning and learning from the post-
simulation analysis and thereby to go beyond the simple diagnosis of 
deviations from standard practice. The method is framed by a three 
dimensional model of organization: structures, relations and meaning: 
“that of structures in which actors’ games take place, that of relations 
between actors who set structures in motion, changing them through their 
games, giving rise to new organisational forms. This dimension also takes 
into account the principles of (sense making) legitimacy through which 
actors justify their games and their constructed orders.” (Jacques and 
Specht, 2006) 
2.3.1. Structures 
Structures consist in what is prescribed by the organization, objectivable 
and measurable: the product of division of work, tasks, the means to 
achieve tasks, formal rules, procedures, technology, coordination tools and 
artifacts, etc.; what Minsberg (1993) calls the hierarchy line, techno-
structure and support services. This first layer allows the organization to 
deal with its routine tasks in a safe way: the “normal situation” is under 
control. It is associated with hierarchy: control is achieved by the 
management layer. 
2.3.2. Relations 
Relations are often represented as the roles played by the different actors. 
Following Crozier and Friedberg (1977), this dimension takes into account 
the fact that the structure is a context for action, which includes relations 
and interactions among people. 
Each actor provides his resources, stakes, interests and power. This 
dimension can be observed at the micro/local level. It concerns verbal and 
non verbal, formal and non formal communication. It raises questions about 
the group’s dynamics. This second layer gives the organization its 
flexibility to deal with deviations. By interacting, people adjust their 
activities to cope with changes from the routine conditions in order to 
proceed with their missions and put the system back into its normal state. 
This layer corresponds to the resilience of the organization. It is associated 
with networking: control is achieved by a series of adjustments and 
interactions at different levels of the hierarchy. 
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2.3.3. Sense 
Sense making is what people use to justify their actions; it is related to the 
notions of legitimacy, ethics, interests and values. The actor’s 
representation of the situation influences his behavior. People belonging to 
different “worlds” have difficulties to act together for a common task 
(Boltansky and Thevenot, 1991), (Weick 1992). 
Organizations that are able to make sense of ambiguous and uncertain 
situations demonstrate their plasticity to deal with unforeseen situations, 
pressure of events and uncertainty, and to avoid chaos and crises. This layer 
corresponds to the robustness of the organization. It is associated to 
emergence: control is achieved by people at any hierarchical level that 
invent ad-hoc solutions where and when they are needed to ensure the 
survival of the organization.  
3. Organization of simulation exercises 
In order to be prepared for emergency management activities, risk-prone 
companies and rescue services organize on a regular basis exercises that 
simulate accidents and catastrophes. In France for instance, a national 
regulation requests that all dangerous industrial sites organize once a year a 
large exercise with rescue services and local authorities. 
The purpose of such exercises is to train people to apply procedures and 
plans, to become familiar with technical systems and locations, and to 
evaluate the efficiency and appropriateness of procedures. Their objective is 
also to give opportunities to the different organizations to communicate and 
act together. These practical sessions have one more advantage: they can be 
organized more frequently than staff turns over. 
In this way, teams become accustomed to work together and if some 
need for improvement is identified, progress can be assessed during the next 
exercise, as it will be carried out by the same people in comparable 
conditions. This advantage is especially great when the exercise concerns 
very rare events and/or when the stakeholders have a high rate of turn-over. 
By running exercises at an appropriate frequency, the organization increases 
its capacities to face “known events”. 
3.1. PREVENTION OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF SIMULATIONS 
When dealing with the management of crisis situations, the interest of such 
exercises in terms of training can be questioned. Crises are situations in 
which plans and procedures are not appropriate, so how exercises can 
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provide experience for such situations? How may exercises increase the 
resilience and robustness of organizations? 
By placing observers in appropriate locations with precise missions 
during emergency exercises, we observed that people playing their roles in 
the exercise sometimes go beyond the procedures describing their tasks: 
when facing various types of difficulties (included or not in the scenario), 
they develop communication and coordination activities with other people 
(inside and outside their organization) and they adapt their activity to the 
real context in which they are. If the debriefing of the exercise is focused on 
the strict application of plans and procedures, such deviations and ad-hoc 
solutions are evaluated negatively by the management and so, they are 
generally hidden or minimized by the participants. 
“Given the emphasis on plans, even those that are impossible to execute, 
it is not surprising that departing from them is often cited as evidence of a 
failure. Disasters, however, break the rules that guide the ordinary conduct 
of business and government, at least for a period of time. Disasters create 
new environments that must be explored, assessed, and comprehended, 
change the physical and social landscape, and therefore require a period of 
exploration, learning, and the development of new approaches”, (Kendra 
and Wachtendorf, 2003). 
These deviations from the standard procedures are indicators of the 
ability of people to adapt to difficulties and by that, they reveal on one hand 
the need for adaptation of procedures and on the other hand the resilience 
and robustness capacities of the organization: the ability of people and 
groups to be flexible and innovative to avoid destabilization and crises.  
3.2. ANALYSIS OF EXERCISES 
Simulating accident situations and collecting lessons learned is a challenge 
both for authorities and for other stakeholders involved. Accident is a 
sensitive situation including technical malfunctions, human errors and 
organizational flaws as root causes. Accident investigation in general is 
often closely focused on finding causes of the accident and less effort is put 
in studying organizational factors that influence the effectiveness of 
emergency management. 
Beyond these difficulties, exercises provide an important source of 
information about emergency management in accident situations. The major 
advantage of simulated cases is that it is easier to collect lessons learned 
and to identify difficulties, if precautions are taken not to put too much 
pressure on participants about responsibility. Tackling the question of guilt 
can form an obstacle to the collection of relevant information about errors 
and organizational drawbacks from participants. 
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Analysis of simulation exercises is based on a method which main 
objective is to develop organizational learning from accidents and crisis. 
This method was originally designed for the analysis of real accident 
situations in industrial plants, public transport (Wybo et al. 2002), floods 
and oil spills.  
The method associates people who have been acting at different levels 
of hierarchy and in different organisms along the development of the 
situation. It is based on collecting individual stories from those who have 
been involved in the management of an accident situation and sharing these 
individual experiences among them in order to develop an organizational 
learning process.  
In the case of real accidents, we select representative people that 
participated in the management of the accident at different levels of the 
hierarchy and from the different organizations (company, rescue services, 
officials, etc.). 
In the case of simulation exercises, we introduce two categories of 
people in the process: a set of people that played the simulation and the 
group of observers. By this way, we get a chance to access the insights of 
the organization at work during the exercise and to identify aspects 
concerning the three levels: structure, interaction and sense. 
Each interview starts with the interviewee telling his “own story”. From 
that narration, the researcher points out the key moments in the story and 
asks questions like “why did you do that?”, “how did you do that?”, “what 
else could have been done?”. By this way, relevant information about 
explicit knowledge (context, events, actions and decisions) can be identified 
from the story, along with some tacit knowledge: perceptions, motivations 
and alternatives. (Wybo 1998). 
This knowledge is formalized as a set of “particles of experience”. 
These particles of experience constitute the meaningful pieces of memories 
of each person having experienced a stressful situation. They represent 
either the person’s reaction to an event or his actions to cope with a change 
in the current situation. An overall picture of the development of the 
situation is then drawn by the researchers, by merging information from 
individual stories into a collective story. Each particle of experience is 
divided into four phases: 
• Context: the main aspects of the current situation; 
• Analysis: how people perceived (on the spot) the situation and its 
evolution, and the hypothesis that were considered; 
• Action: decisions made and actions carried out; 
• Effect: a posteriori evaluation of effects of actions on the development 
of the situation. 
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This common story is then discussed and validated during a “mirror 
meeting” gathering all participants, in order to reach an agreement among 
them and to identify lessons to learn from the management of that exercise. 
The collective processing of individual perceptions, suggestions and 
experiences favors the commitment of participants to the conclusions 
reached during the process, which is very useful to promote learning in the 
organization and to apply the lessons learned in the future. 
3.3. OBSERVATION OF EXERCISES 
Based on this method, the introduction of specialized observers was tested 
in several exercises, in order to get the full picture of the organization at 
work and to identify these deviations from the prescribed world, from the 
combination of the points of view of the participants and the points of view 
of the different observers. 
Three kinds of observers were defined: those who observe the activity 
of key people (information they receive and emit, people with whom they 
collaborate, decisions they make, etc.), those who observe a specific task 
(how it is achieved, difficulties encountered, who participates, what 
resources are used, etc.) and those who observe a specific place (who is 
there, what is done, how this place is perceived by people, etc.). 
Using this combination of points of view (people playing roles and 
specialized observers), we build the “full picture” of the simulation that we 
present to the players during the debriefing session. This analysis results in 
the identification of a number of deviations, in particular the emergence of 
organizational patterns and communication flows among stakeholders, 
some of them proving efficient to prevent the situation from turning into 
crisis. Studying the character and value of these deviations makes it 
possible to capitalize on them to improve emergency procedures and plans, 
and to increase the mutual knowledge and efficient cooperation of 
stakeholders (Wybo, 2006). 
“The reliability of learning of an organization is if it develops common 
understandings of its experience and makes its interpretation public, stable 
and shared.” (March, Sproull, Tamuz, 1991) 
3.3.1. Case 1: assessment of resilience capacities 
We present here an example of this method to the simulation of an 
emergency in a road tunnel. The scenario was: a truck carrying a toxic gas 
tank stops in the tunnel as its tank is leaking; the driver goes to the nearest 
emergency shelter and calls the tunnel control room; four cars and a bus are 
in the tunnel at that time and stop at a walking distance from the truck. 
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This exercise was set to test the management of such accident and to 
understand the behavior of passengers before the rescue services reach the 
site. More than 200 rescue people participated in the exercise, plus 
passengers of vehicles, tunnel operators, policemen and officials in the 
control room. 30 observers participated in the instrumentation of the 
exercise. 
During the exercise, the tunnel management software partially failed 
(this was not in the scenario) and it was no more possible for the operator to 
answer calls from rescue shelters in the tunnel with the usual hardware (PC 
display, mouse and audio helmet). He remembered that there was a 
secondary rack that permitted to answer those calls, but this rack was 
difficult to access (in a dark part of the room, near the ground) and the 
indication of the calling shelter number was difficult to read (small digits, 
not illuminated). Anyway, the operator took with him a paper map of the 
tunnel with indication of shelter phone numbers & locations and began to 
answer calls. 
By the way, he succeeded to get essential information from the people 
calling, reassure them and give them simple indications to be safe while 
rescue forces were on their way. This is an example of the robustness 
capacities of this operator, which allowed him to keep people safe in the 
tunnel and to give precious indications to rescue services (how many 
people, in which locations: cars, bus and shelters). 
3.3.2. Case 2: assessment of a lack of robustness 
On the other side, it is also possible to observe and understand some 
drawbacks that would ruin the efficiency of emergency management in a 
real situation. 
In the simulation of another accident in a road tunnel, two observers 
were placed in the control room of the tunnel: one observing the manager 
on duty and the other observing the activity in the control room. At the 
same time, other observers were inside and outside the tunnel (15 observers 
participated in this simulation). When the simulated accident occurred 
(collision of a car with a truck, putting fire to both vehicles), some of the 
car passengers, shocked but not wounded, were wandering on foot in the 
tunnel, looking for an escape route, and the rescue services took a long time 
to localize and shelter them. In real conditions, those people would 
probably die from smoke heat and toxicity. 
By combining observers’ data, we identified the organizational cause of 
this difficulty. The control room operator was facing a set of video screens 
in which it was possible to observe these people wandering in the tunnel. At 
the same time, in a corner of the room, an operator from the rescue team 
had established a radio terminal to communicate with their colleagues in the 
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tunnel and they were listening to the conversations over the radio. Finally, 
the manager on duty was trying to assess the situation and prepared to 
answer the requests that he could receive from the chief of rescue forces 
(located at one of the exits of the tunnel) or other stakeholders. 
But the operator had not been told to report to the manager what he saw 
on the videos (he was trained to answer questions, not to be proactive) and 
the operator managing the radio terminal was not trained to identify 
problems that his colleagues encountered in their actions from what he 
heard over the radio, so none of them communicated to each other or to the 
tunnel manager. 
When the analysis of the different observations (in the control room, in 
the tunnel, at the rescue headquarters, etc.) was carried out, this drawback 
appeared as a lack of capacities of sense making in this group of people: 
none of them took an initiative to invent a form of cooperation that was not 
defined in the emergency plan. 
From this analysis, it was possible for the tunnel managers and the 
rescue officers to share these results with their staff and to set up improved 
emergency procedures. This analysis also pointed out the importance of 
interactions among people from different organisms and proactive 
behaviors to build resilience and robustness capacities; otherwise even the 
best structure (cameras and video screens, wireless communications, 
procedures, etc.) is useless in such degraded situations. 
4. Conclusion 
Simulations are one of the most efficient tools that can be used to train 
people to emergency situations, especially for situations with a low 
frequency of occurrence and a high potential of damage. 
Emergency services and risk-prone companies have gained significant 
experience in the setting up of exercises and this practice contributes to the 
capacity of their organizations to face “planned” emergencies 
(reinforcement of the structure layer). 
In order to face situations that may turn into crisis, because of surprise, 
speed of development, uncertainty, lack of resources or difficulties in 
communications among stakeholders, organizations need to assess and 
develop their resilience and robustness capacities. In this paper we have 
shown that exercises can contribute to that on the condition that their 
analysis goes beyond naïve interpretations and gives access to the 
complexity of organizational behavior, specially the levels of interaction 
and sense making. 
The method presented here provides means to reach this objective with 
only minor changes in the simulation set up. By defining specific missions 
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for observers based on a model of organizational behavior, it is possible to 
identify more precisely the organization's resilience and robustness 
capacities and handicaps. 
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